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148 This book by and large meets the high expectations raised by its catchy title: it 
provides important insights on the evolution of capitalism in the global economy 
during the first two decades of the 21st century. The concept of intangible capital 
– computerised information, innovative property and economic competencies – 
helps explain developments as diverse as the long-term decline in business fixed 
investment, low measured productivity growth, the rise of giant technology firms, 
the shift in financial intermediation from banks to markets, and the growth of ine-
quality. The book is broad in coverage yet is focussed on the core theme; it is well-
articulated and informative for economists as well as other social scientists and 
non-specialists. And importantly, it provides sound and insightful policy advice.
Unlike the technological breakthroughs of the past century – for instance in trans-
portation and telecommunications, electricity generation and use, new materials, 
agriculture, medicine – digital technologies are largely disembodied. Computer 
software, databases, product and service designs, organisational skills and busi-
ness processes take no physical form. This “intangible” character of much of 
today’s capital, in contrast to machines, factory buildings, power plants, laborato-
ries, scientific equipment and so on, is important because, as Haskel and Westlake 
argue, it changes the way that the market economy works. 
To get to that big picture, Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake begin by discussing 
what intangible capital is and what its special properties are.1 The first studies on 
the contribution of different types of knowledge to economic output date back to 
the early 1960s. At the time, economists such as Fritz Machlup and Zvi Griliches 
began to measure expenditure on R&D and started to question the then established 
view that research and development (R&D), product design, training, branding 
and the like were an intermediate input. 
The next step in understanding the role of intangible capital was to account for the 
contribution of computer hardware and software in investment statistics. The first 
task faced an immediate challenge: the price of hardware has to be properly 
adjusted for quality improvements. Otherwise, the tendency for computer prices to 
fall over time results in an erroneous conclusion that spending on computer hard-
ware accounts for a declining proportion of total investment. It took almost 20 
years, starting in the early 1980s, for this adjustment to be properly implemented 
by statistical agencies, first in western Europe and then in the United States. 
That was followed by accounting for software. Many companies and institutions 
write their own computer codes, which represent a long-lasting form of knowl-
edge that has no tangible form. Citibank, for instance, once employed more pro-
grammers than Microsoft (p. 40). While both economists and statisticians 
1 Jonathan Haskel is professor of economics at Imperial College Business School in London, and since Sep-
tember 2018 an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, a body that sets poli-
cy interest rates in the United Kingdom. Stian Westlake is Executive Director of Policy and Research at Nesta, 
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149concluded that software ought to be treated like an investment, the problem was 
that there was no place for software on various investment surveys that statistical 
agencies asked firms to fill out. Again, it took several years to implement this 
change. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis started counting expenditure on 
software as part of investment spending in 1999, followed by the UK statistical 
authorities in 2001.
In a pioneering work on the measurement of intangible capital, Corrado, Hulten 
and Sichel (2005) defined three broad categories of intangible investment: comput-
erised information, innovative property, and economic competencies.2 Computer-
ised information includes investment such as purchasing software, writing own 
software, and developing and maintaining databases. Innovative property covers 
investment spending on R&D, mineral exploration, creating entertainment and 
artistic originals, and design and other product development costs. Economic com-
petencies include other expenditure that does not directly involve innovation or 
computers: training of staff (i.e., investment in a company’s human capital); mar-
keting and branding (i.e., investment in understanding customer needs); and spend-
ing on organisational capital (i.e., re-engineering of business processes) that creates 
distinctive business models or corporate cultures. Statistical agencies around the 
world have gradually taken over this categorisation of intangible investment. In the 
United States, the first to implement it fully, capitalisation of software added about 
1.1% to the 1999 GDP, while R&D added 2.5% to the 2012 GDP. Investment in 
intangible capital is already estimated to exceed that in tangible capital in Finland, 
Ireland, the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
An important contribution of the book is a discussion in Chapter 4 of the distin-
guishing characteristics of intangible investment. Haskel and Westlake propose 
four such characteristics: scalability, sunkenness, spillovers, and synergies. The 
first of the four S’s, scalability, stems from the non-rival nature of intangible 
assets. For instance, once a company has developed its human resources manage-
ment software, it can use it in multiple locations at the same time without any 
additional cost. By contrast, physical assets such as trucks can only be used in one 
place at one time: they are not scalable the way intangible capital is. 
The second feature is that the cost of developing intangible capital is largely irre-
coverable or “sunk”. For instance, an airline company that developed its own 
software for flight reservations is unlikely to find a buyer for that system if it goes 
out of business. That contrasts with tangible assets such as delivery vehicles, 
which can be sold off to recover partly the initial investment costs. 
Intangible investments by one firm also tend to have large spillovers to other 
firms. Unless protected by comprehensive patents, the benefits from R&D 
2 See Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D., 2005. Measuring capital and technology: an expanded framework 
in: C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger and D. Sichel, eds. Measuring capital in the new economy. Chicago: Univer-
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150 investment and software development – not to mention innovations in business 
organisation, training and branding of products and services – also tend to benefit 
firms that did not pay for such investment. While this may also be the case with 
investments in some physical assets, e.g., in transportation infrastructure, it is 
easier to establish property and usage rights over tangible assets than intangibles. 
In fact, as Haskel and Westlake remind us, much of the legal system and institu-
tional history is based on the establishment of property rights over capital assets. 
Intangible investments also exhibit synergies with one another – e.g., hardware 
with software – and with tangible investments – e.g., computers and software 
have dramatically increased productivity and investment in warehousing and dis-
tribution of goods and services since the 1990s. As Haskel and Westlake explain, 
such synergies matter because they create incentives to bring together different 
intangibles, especially new ideas. This encourages openness and sharing rather 
than appropriation of knowledge. At the same time, it encourages firms to protect 
their intangible investments against competition – not by protecting individual 
assets (e.g., through patents), but by creating clusters of intangibles, for instance 
mobile phone operating systems, data bases, streaming services and so on.
These four distinguishing characteristics of intangible capital have some impor-
tant consequences for the development of the central thesis of the book, that the 
growing proportion of intangible capital in total investment changes the way the 
market economy functions. Most of the book – Chapters 5–11 – is devoted to the 
analysis of some of these consequences. Only a few are noted here.
Perhaps the easiest to understand is the impact of intangible capital on market 
competition. Scalability enables successful companies in an intangible-rich econ-
omy to grow very fast and expand globally. With their superior technology and 
integrated business processes, successful tech firms can create major obstacles to 
the competition of incumbent and entry of new firms. This may affect the com-
petitive structure of some industries – retail, travel agencies, and taxi services are 
just some of the more recent examples. 
Although intangible-rich companies may on their own invest huge amounts in 
R&D, productivity growth in the entire economy may stagnate. The reason is that 
potential competitors may be discouraged from entering a market in which a few 
dominant firms already have a technological and competitive edge – for instance, 
a more powerful internet search engine. Leading firms can easily overtake their 
competitors by scaling up on their intangible assets, and by assimilating knowl-
edge through acquisition of potential rivals, often start-ups. This may result in a 
growing gap between leading (“frontier”) and lagging firms and, in aggregate, a 
slower productivity growth in the economy. This explanation, developed in 
Chapter 5, provides an interesting angle on the debate on so-called secular stag-
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151The four S’s of intangible capital also imply that intangible-rich companies are not 
confined to a specific location. They can shift their operations globally, according, 
for example, to the tax treatment they receive in a given location. This may create 
unhealthy tax competition among cities, regions and countries vying to attract 
successful tech companies, not to mention any resulting revenue losses. It also 
means that more resources than otherwise may be wasted on unproductive lobby-
ing and rent-seeking activities. 
There are important consequences of intangibles for the rise of inequality as well. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the synergies and spillovers that intangibles create 
make it easier for intangibles-rich companies to attract talent with the education 
and skills needed to work in knowledge-based industries, and to pay them higher 
wages. Recent research suggests that such inter-firm differences can explain a 
significant proportion of the rise in income inequality. In addition, the rise of 
intangible industries makes cities with network externalities increasingly attrac-
tive places to live and work in. Given the limited supply of land for development 
in most urban centres, rising demand for housing inevitably drives up property 
prices. And as housing is the main form of wealth for most families, house price 
inflation is one of the key determinants for growing wealth inequality.
No less important are the consequences of intangible capital for investment financ-
ing, elaborated in Chapter 8. Traditional ways of funding business investment – 
borrowing from banks and issuing bonds in corporate debt markets – are not suit-
able for financing intangible investments. The reason is that such capital does not 
have the properties of traditional collateral: it is not tangible (unless protected by 
copyright or patents) so creditors cannot seize and sell it to recoup losses if the 
borrower can’t repay the loan or make payments on the bond it issued. This 
implies that much of intangible capital has to be financed by issuing equity, or 
from a firm’s retained earnings. Buyers of intangible firms’ equity are unlikely to 
be traditional ones, retail or institutional investors, but rather specialised invest-
ment and venture capital funds. This, in turn, has consequences for the way intan-
gible-rich firms are managed as well as for their growth and life cycle. 
What does all this imply for public policy? Haskel and Westlake examine five 
questions in Chapter 10 that they see as most challenging for policymakers in an 
intangible-rich economy. The first one is how to develop a “good” intellectual 
property rights framework for intangible capital. As noted above, it is hard to 
prove who owns intangibles, and even then, their benefits tend to spill over to 
many users. The second one is how to maximise the benefits of synergies associ-
ated with intangible capital. In particular, how to devise urban land use rules, and 
plan and develop physical infrastructure in cities so as to create the best possible 
conditions for knowledge and innovative ideas to spread easily. The third chal-
lenge is how to facilitate the financing of an intangible economy, in particular the 
shift from debt to equity financing. A core issue is the tax treatment of debt: tax 
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152 payments but not on the cost of equity. The fourth policy challenge is how to 
encourage more investment in intangibles. What combination of favourable con-
ditions for private investment on the one hand, and public investment on the 
other – public R&D funding, public procurement, training and education – will 
help knowledge-based, intangible-rich activities to spread? And finally, how is 
one to cope with the income and wealth inequality associated with the rise of 
intangible economy?
Haskel and Westlake develop a number of policy proposals to tackle these five 
challenges. They are not only embedded in sound economic analysis and sup-
ported by empirical findings, but also make good common sense. Particularly illu-
minating is the comparison of policy approaches in two fictional countries in 
Chapter 9. Not surprisingly, one feature that makes a big difference in how coun-
tries cope with the challenges of intangible economy is social capital. Trust and 
social cohesion make it easier for ideas to spread around the economy through 
social networks. They also make it politically more feasible to mitigate the conse-
quences of rising inequality through government policy. Where social cohesion is 
weak and mistrust of institutions and other social groups is widespread, the grow-
ing importance of intangibles often leads to economic pressures. Those pressures, 
in turn, exacerbate the political divides driving today’s populist movements. 
